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Abstract—Since the inception of Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL)
algorithms, there has been a growing interest in both research and
industrial communities in the promising potentials of this paradigm. The
list of current and envisioned applications of deep RL ranges from
autonomous navigation and robotics to control applications in the critical
infrastructure, air traffic control, defense technologies, and cybersecu-
rity. While the landscape of opportunities and the advantages of deep
RL algorithms are justifiably vast, the security risks and issues in such
algorithms remain largely unexplored. To facilitate and motivate further
research on these critical challenges, this paper presents a foundational
treatment of the security problem in DRL. We formulate the security
requirements of DRL, and provide a high-level threat model through
the classification and identification of vulnerabilities, attack vectors, and
adversarial capabilities. Furthermore, we present a review of current
literature on security of deep RL from both offensive and defensive
perspectives. Lastly, we enumerate critical research venues and open
problems in mitigation and prevention of intentional attacks against deep
RL as a roadmap for further research in this area.
1 INTRODUCTION
Since the inception of Artificial Intelligence (AI), a core
objective of this science has been to pursue the creation of
agents that autonomously learn skills and desired behaviors
from self-guided interactions with the environment. This
pursuit is greatly inspired by a biological parallel preva-
lent in natural learners such as humans, who learn from
experience to repeat those behaviors that seem to result in
higher rewards [1]. Attempts to utilize this mechanism in
the engineering of behaviors in natural agents are not new,
as documented in psychological literature under paradigm
of conditioning [2]. Adopting the grounds developed for
natural agents, machine learning research has developed
the framework of Reinforcement Learning (RL) for artificial
agents.
While the basic formulation and algorithms for RL were
introduced decades back [3], the feasibility and applicability
of this framework were mostly severely constrained to sim-
ple problems and environments due to the computational
requirements and the need for manual feature engineering
[4]. This was greatly overturned with the advancements
in computing (e.g., GPUs), as well as the integration of
deep learning with RL [5]. The latter provides RL with
the powerful feature learning capabilities of deep neural
networks, thus enabling the end-to-end learning of complex
skills from raw inputs in complex environments. This new
framework, known as Deep RL (DRL), has led to many
promising results in various settings, such as learning to
play video games [6], beating the human champion at the
game of Go [7], and autonomous navigation [8].
In recent years, the versatility and performance of DRL
has motivated extensive research on its application to many
domains, ranging from driverless vehicles [9] and robotic
manipulation [10] to healthcare [11], algorithmic trading
[12], and automated control of smart grids [13], transporta-
tion systems [14] and air traffic management [15]. In some
domains, such as robotics [16] and portfolio management
[16], applications of DRL are grown beyond academic inter-
est into deployed solutions.
With such rampant adoption of DRL into commercial
and critical systems, ensuring the security of these appli-
cations is of growing importance. As a major component
of cyber-physical and financial systems, DRL controllers
present an attractive attack surface to adversaries aiming
to manipulate or otherwise compromise the functions of
dependent systems. As detailed in Section 3, the security
problem is different from those that the area of safe RL [17]
are concerned with. The objective of safe RL is to ensure that
the agent does not learn to behave in ways that are not in
compliance with some pre-defined criteria. For instance, one
criteria for safety in RL-based agent trained for autonomous
navigation is to learn a policy that avoids collisions. The se-
curity problem is however concerned with settings in which
an adversarial element intentionally seeks to compromise
the natural operation of the system for malicious purposes.
In the example of autonomous navigation, an agent with
a provably safe RL policy can be forced into collisions via
means such as the intentional perturbation of sensory input
[18], as detailed in the following sections. Hence, while there
are overlapping areas between RL safety and security, a
different approach is required to study the security problem.
While the security of supervised and unsupervised ma-
chine learning systems has enjoyed extensive attention from
the research community [19][20][21], the work on vulnera-
bilities and security of DRL is sparse and sporadic. Since the
reports by Behzadan & Munir [22] and Huang et al. [23] in
early 2017, few papers have studied this problem with focus
on narrow aspects of security in DRL. Thus, there remains a
need for a holistic formulation of the security issues in DRL,
as well as a roadmap for further researcher.
This paper aims to fill this gap by providing a com-
prehensive analysis of the security threats in DRL from a
technical perspective. Furthermore, we study the state of
the art in current literature and identify major venues of
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2research that remain largely unexplored. Accordingly, the
main contributions of this paper are:
• Formulation of the security problem in DRL;
• Proposal of a generic threat model in terms of attack
surface in DRL, adversarial capabilities, and attack
objectives;
• Formulation and analysis of attacks at both training
and inference phases;
• Review of current literature on attacks and defenses
in DRL
• Enumeration of critical open research problems and
challenges in ensuring the security of DRL
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 reviews the fundamentals of RL and DRL, and
provides an overview of adversarial machine learning. Sec-
tion 3 formalizes the security problem in RL, and presents
threat models for adversarial attacks against DRL. Section
4 reviews the current state of the art in the types and
mechanisms for attacks at training and inference phases of
DRL, the defenses against such attacks, simulation bench-
marks, and evaluation metrics. In Section 5 multiple critical
venues requiring further research are identified, and Section
6 concludes the paper with a summary of the findings.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Deep Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement learning is concerned with agents that inter-
act with an environment and exploit their experiences to
optimize a decision-making policy. The generic RL problem
can be formally modeled as a Markov Decision Process
(MDP), described by the tuple MDP = (S,A,R, P ), where
S is the set of reachable states in the process, A is the
set of available actions, R is the mapping of transitions
to the immediate reward, and P represents the transition
probabilities (i.e., dynamics), which are initially unknown
to RL agents. At any given time-step t, the MDP is at a state
st ∈ S. The RL agent’s choice of action at time t, at ∈ A
causes a transition from st to a state st+1 according to the
transition probability P atst,st+1 . The agent receives a reward
rt+1 for choosing the action at at state st. Interactions of
the agent with MDP are determined by the policy pi. When
such interactions are deterministic, the policy pi : S → A
is a mapping between the states and their corresponding
actions. A stochastic policy pi(s) represents the probability
distribution of implementing any action a ∈ A at state s. The
goal of RL is to learn a policy that maximizes the expected
discounted return E[Rt], where Rt =
∑∞
k=0 γ
krt+k; with rt
denoting the instantaneous reward received at time t, and
γ is a discount factor γ ∈ [0, 1]. The value of a state st is
defined as the expected discounted return from st following
a policy pi, that is, V pi(st) = E[Rt|st, pi]. The action-value
(Q-value) Qpi(st, at) = E[Rt|st, at, pi] is the value of state st
after using action at and following a policy pi thereafter.
There are three main approaches to solving RL problems
according to their optimization objective: methods that are
based on value functions, those that are based on policy search,
and a hybrid of both in actor-critic configurations. The details
of each approach is presented as follows:
2.1.1 Value Iteration and Deep Q-Network
Value iteration refers to a class of algorithms for RL that
optimize a value function (e.g., V(.) or Q(.,.)) to extract the
optimal policy from it. As an instance of value iteration
algorithms, Q-Learning aims to maximize for the action-
value functionQ through the iterative formulation of Eq. (1):
Q(s, a) = R(s, a) + γmaxa′(Q(s
′, a′)) (1)
Where s′ is the state that emerges as a result of action
a, and a′ is a possible action in state s′. The optimal Q
value given a policy pi is hence defined as: Q∗(s, a) =
maxpiQ
pi(s, a), and the optimal policy is given by pi∗(s) =
arg maxaQ(s, a).
The Q-learning method estimates the optimal action
policies by using the Bellman formulation Qi+1(s, a) =
E[R+γmaxaQi] as the iterative update of a value iteration
technique. Practical implementation of Q-learning is com-
monly based on function approximation of the parametrized
Q-function Q(s, a; θ) ≈ Q∗(s, a). A common technique for
approximating the parametrized non-linear Q-function is
via neural network models whose weights correspond to
the parameter vector θ. Such neural networks, commonly
referred to as Q-networks, are trained such that at every
iteration i, the following loss function is minimized:
Li(θi) = Es,a∼ρ(.)[(yi −Q(s, a, ; θi))2] (2)
where yi = E[R + γmaxa′ Q(s′, a′; θi−1)|s, a], and
ρ(s, a) is a probability distribution over states s and actions
a. This optimization problem is typically solved using com-
putationally efficient techniques such as Stochastic Gradient
Descent (SGD).
Classical Q-networks introduce a number of major prob-
lems in the Q-learning process. First, the sequential process-
ing of consecutive observations breaks the iid (Independent
and Identically Distributed) requirement of training data
as successive samples are correlated. Furthermore, slight
changes to Q-values leads to rapid changes in the policy
estimated by Q-network, thus enabling policy oscillations.
Also, since the scale of rewards and Q-values are unknown,
the gradients of Q-networks can be sufficiently large to
render the backpropagation process unstable.
A Deep Q-Network (DQN) [6] is a training algorithm
designed to resolve these problems. To overcome the issue
of correlation between consecutive observations, DQN em-
ploys a technique called experience replay: instead of training
on successive observations, experience replay samples a
random batch of previous observations stored in the replay
memory to train on. As a result, the correlation between
successive training samples is broken and the iid setting
is re-established. In order to avoid oscillations, DQN fixes
the parameters of a network Qˆ, which represents the op-
timization target yi. These parameters are then updated at
regular intervals by adopting the current weights of the Q-
network. The issue of unstability in backpropagation is also
solved in DQN by normalizing the reward values to the
range [−1,+1], thus preventing Q-values from becoming
too large.
Mnih et al. [6] demonstrate the application of this new
Q-network technique to end-to-end learning of Q values in
playing Atari games based on observations of pixel values
in the game environtment. To capture the movements in the
game environment, Mnih et al. use stacks of four consec-
utive image frames as the input to the network. To train
3the network, a random batch is sampled from the previous
observation tuples (st, at, rt, st+1), where rt denotes the
reward at time t. Each observation is then processed by two
layers of convolutional neural networks to learn the features
of input images, which are then employed by feed-forward
layers to approximate the Q-function. The target network Qˆ,
with parameters θ−, is synchronized with the parameters
of the original Q network at fixed periods intervals. i.e., at
every ith iteration, θ−t = θt, and is kept fixed until the next
synchronization. The target value for optimization of DQN
thus becomes:
y′t ≡ rt+1 + γmaxa′Qˆ(st+1, a′; θ−) (3)
Accordingly, the training process can be stated as:
minat(y
′
t −Q(st, at, θ))2 (4)
As for the exploration mechanism, the original DQN
employs the -greedy technique, which monotonically de-
creases the probability of taking random actions as the train-
ing progresses [3]. However, recent literature proposes var-
ious alternatives such as parameter-space noise exploration
[24]. Although adding independent noise for exploration is
usable in continuous control problems, more sophisticated
strategies inject noise that is correlated over time (e.g., from
stochastic processes) in order to better preserve momentum
[25].
In [26], Hasselt et al. demonstrate that the single estima-
tor used in the update rule of Q-learning (provided in Eq (2))
overestimates the expected return, as it uses the maximum
action value as an approximation of the maximum expected
action value. As a solution, [27] presents a generalization
of the Double Q-learning algorithm [26], and develops
Double DQN (DDQN) that separates action selection and
action evaluation, i.e., one DQN is used to determine the
maximizing action and a second one is used to estimate its
value.
2.1.2 Policy Search Methods
The optimization objective of policy search methods is to di-
rectly find policies via either gradient-free or gradient-based
methods. While gradient-free methods such as evolutionary
methods have resulted in some success in this area, much of
the recent developments are focused on policy gradient (i.e.,
gradient-based) methods [5]. In policy gradient methods,
the policy is directly parametrized in the form pi(a|s; θ),
where pi is a probability distribution over actions a when
observing state s, as parameterized by θ, which can be a
neural network. The agent exercises this policy in the en-
vironment and collects experiences. Periodically, it uses the
experience samples to update θ by estimating the gradient
∇θE[Rt]. Typically, the agent then discard these samples
and repeats this process on new samples, optimizing the
policy iteratively. Two of the most significant algorithms for
solving policy gradient are TRPO and PPO, detailed below:
Trust Region Policy Optimization (TRPO): TRPO has
been shown to be relatively robust and applicable to do-
mains with high-dimensional inputs [28]. To achieve this,
TRPO optimizes a surrogate objective function, specifi-
cally, it optimizes an (importance sampled) advantage es-
timate, constrained using a quadratic approximation of the
Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence. Whilst TRPO can be used
as a pure policy gradient method with a simple baseline,
later work by Schulman et al. [29] introduces Generalized
Advantage Estimation (GAE), which proposes several, more
advanced variance reduction baselines. The combination
of TRPO and GAE remains one of the stateof-the-art RL
techniques in continuous control. However, the constrained
optimization of TRPO requires calculating second-order gra-
dients, limiting its applicability.
Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO): PPO [30] is a
closely related algorithm that improves sample complexity
(i.e., the number of samples required to learn an opti-
mal policy) by increasing the training use of each sample.
It maximizes a “surrogate” objective E[ρt(θ)At], where
ρt(θ) = pi(at|st; θ)/pi(at|st; θold) is the likelihood ratio of the
recorded action between the updated and original policies.
Unlike A3C, PPO performs multiple parameter updates
using minibatches from each set of samples.
2.1.3 Advantage Actor-Critic
Actor-critic methods combine value functions with an ex-
plicit representation of the policy. In such methods, the actor
represents a policy that leverages the feedback from the
value function (i.e., critic) to optimize towards an optimal
policy. In advantage actor-critic methods, the policy gradi-
ent is computed as E[∇θ log pi(at|st; θ)(Rt − V (st))]. The
agent estimates V (st) from the data via a separate output
from the same network used for pi. (Rt − V (st)) estimates
the advantage A(s, a) = Q(s, a) − V (s). Rt is computed
using the discounted sum of as many future returns as are
observed in a given batch, up to rtmax , where tmax is the
horizon of interest to the agent (e.g., end of an episode). The
estimator V (s; θ) is trained according to squared-error loss,
simultaneously to pi. Lastly, an entropy bonus is added to
the gradient: ∇θH(pi(.|st; θ)), to promote exploration and
discourage premature convergence.
Notable instances of Advantage Actor-Critic methods
include:
The Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (DDPG) [25] is an
improvement of the original DPG algorithm [31], adding ex-
perience replay and target networks. Experience is collected
into a buffer and updates to actor and critic models are com-
puted using mini-batch updates with random samples from
this buffer. Furthermore, a second set of target networks is
maintained for use in computing the loss.
The Asynchronous Advantage Actor-Critic (A3C) algorithm
[32] is comprised of separate actor-learner threads that sam-
ple environment steps and update a centralized copy of the
parameters asynchronously to each other.
On the other hand, the Advantage Actor-Critic (A2C)
algorithm [33] uses a single-threaded learner to sample from
separate environment instances and collects all data into one
minibatch to compute the gradient.
2.2 Security of Machine Learning
As data-driven systems, machine learning algorithms are
known to be vulnerable to various types of adversarial
actions. Such actions can be broadly classified as those
affecting the training phase of the learning process, and
those targeting the inference phase (i.e., test-time) [19].
In the training phase, adversaries may aim to influence
the learning process by manipulating the training data. This
type of attack is generally referred to as poisoning [34]. An
example of poisoning attacks is the case of online spam
4classifiers, where an adversary can intentionally mislabel
spam emails as benign to compromise the accuracy of the
model retrained on new data [35].
In the inference phase, the adversary may implement
an evasion attack by providing malicious input that induce
incorrect inferences at the output of a machine learning
model [36]. This type of malicious input is generally referred
to as adversarial example [37]. A noteworthy property of
adversarial examples in their transferability: an adversarial
example crafted for a particular model may also affect
other models with different architectures that are trained
on datasets with similar distributions to that of the original
model [38].
According to the objective of adversaries, adversarial
example attacks are generally classified into the following
two categories:
1) Misclassification attacks, which aim for generating
examples that are classified incorrectly by the target
network
2) Targeted attacks, whose goal is to generate samples
that the target misclassifies into an arbitrary class
designated by the attacker.
To generate such adversarial examples, several algo-
rithms have been proposed, such as the Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) by Goodfellow et al., [39], and the Jacobian
Saliency Map Algorithm (JSMA) approach by Papernot et
al., [40]. A grounding assumption in many of the crafting
algorithms is that the attacker has complete knowledge of
the target neural networks such as its architecture, weights,
and other hyperparameters. In response, Papernot et al. [41]
proposed the first blackbox approach to generating adver-
sarial examples. This method exploits the transferability of
adversarial examples: an adversarial example generated for
a neural network classifier applies to most other neural
network classifiers that perform the same classification task,
regardless of their architecture, parameters, and even the
distribution of training data. Accordingly, the approach of
[41] is based on generating a replica of the target network.
To train this replica, the attacker creates and trains over a
dataset from a mixture of samples obtained by observing
target’s interaction with the environment, and synthetically
generated inputs and label pairs. Once trained, any of the
algorithms that require knowledge of the target network
for crafting adversarial examples can be applied to the
replica. Due to the transferability of adversarial examples,
the perturbed data points generated for the replica network
can induce misclassifications in many of the other networks
that perform the same task.
Another class of adversarial actions is comprised of
those that aim to infer information about the internal pa-
rameters of the model or the training dataset [19]. One
instance of such attacks is that of model extraction [42], in
which the adversary estimates the parameters of a model
from observations of its input-output data points. Besides
compromising the confidentiality of models as intellectual
properties, an adversary may utilize the extracted model
in circumventing the difficulties of blackbox attacks [41].
Other instances of attacks on confidentiality are training
data extraction [43] and membership attacks [44], which
aim to infer information about the training set and extract
personally-identifiable information from the model.
While the current literature on machine learning security
includes various proposals for mitigation of these attacks,
majority of solutions provide ad hoc alleviation of the prob-
lem and are not generalizable to other classes of algorithms.
For training-time attacks, notable solutions are those that
aim to minimize the impact of outliers in models based
on Principle Component Analysis (e.g., [45]) and Support
Vector Machines (e.g., [46]). As for attacks targeting the
inference phase, notable solutions include gradient masking
(e.g., [47] and [48]) and injecting adversarial examples in the
training dataset (e.g., [39]). Yet, all such defenses are shown
to be weak against adaptive adversaries [19]. For more in-
depth studies on the state of security in machine learning,
readers can refer to [19] and [21].
3 THREAT MODEL
As with other types of machine learning techniques, DRL is
also prone to adversarial actions similar to those mentioned
in Section 2.2. While many aspects of DRL are similar to
other machine learning techniques such as deep learning
classifiers, the inherent differences in their learning dynam-
ics and applications gives rise to security issues that are
specific to DRL. One such difference is in the nature of the
training data: in general, supervised learning is trained on a
dataset sampled from a fixed distribution. One consequence
of this fact is that poisoning attacks cause a shift in the
distribution, and hence detection and mitigation of such
shifts has been the primary approach in defending against
poisoning attacks. However, the exploration mechanism in
DRL inevitably results in changes in the distribution of
training samples. In other words, both the attack mechanism
and any defensive approach against poisoning attacks on
DRL are fundamentally different from those of supervised
learning. Furthermore, DRL agents are typically tasked
with solving sequential decision-making problems. In many
cases, this task implies a delayed-reward mechanism. For
example, when playing chess, one may not receive any
reward for any of its actions until the game is over. This
is fundamentally different from supervised learning, where
the availability of labels enable straightforward calculation
of accuracy and other performance metrics for the model.
Also, even after the training phase, many DRL agents
retain a level of randomness in their output actions (i.e.,
the action at is not always derived from a deterministic
policy). As a result, distinguishing adversarial attacks from
benign actions derived from stochastic policies is not as
straightforward as the case of supervised learning. Indeed,
it can be shown that both supervised and unsupervised
mechanisms can be reduced from the RL framework (i.e.,
can be formulated as instances of RL), but the inverse is
not true [49]. In other words, DRL inherits the fundamental
security issues in supervised and unsupervised learning, as
well as other issues that are unique to RL and DRL.
As detailed in Section 2.2, adversarial attacks against
DRL agents aim to compromise the normal operating cri-
teria of such agents. From the standpoint of cybersecurity,
the compromise may be viewed as affecting one or more di-
mensions of the Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability (CIA)
triad [50], as detailed below:
Confidentiality of a DRL agent refers to the need for
keeping the internal configurations of the agent from ex-
5posure to adversaries. These configurations include agent’s
reward function, the training mechanism (e.g., hyperpa-
rameters, algorithm), and the learned policy function. For
instance, inference of the policy function can result in loss of
proprietary assets. Furthermore, knowledge of the internal
configurations may enable the adversary to launch further
attacks with more precision and efficiency.
Integrity in DRL is the ability to learn or enact policies
in the manner intended by the designer. Adversaries may
compromise the integrity of a DRL agent by forcing it to
learn incorrect policies, or to perform actions other than
those prescribed by a learned policy.
Availability is the ability of a DRL agent to perform train-
ing or actions when needed. Adversarial compromise of
this dimension may be in the form of denying convergence
during DRL training, or preventing the agent from acting in
response to changes in the environment.
The problem of DRL security may resemble those stud-
ied under safe RL [17], but as mentioned in Section 1, the
presence of adversarial intention in the security problem
gives rise to challenges that are beyond the scope of safe
RL. Also, we must differentiate between DRL security and
the area of adversarial RL [51]. The latter is concerned with
multi-agent RL settings, in which agents aim to maximize
their returns in competition with other agents. While some
DRL security problems can be modeled as adversarial RL
(e.g., [18]), this cannot be generalized as the adversary is not
necessarily a learning agent.
3.1 DRL Attack Surface
Figure 1 depicts the major components of a DRL agent
in both training and inference phases. Each of these com-
ponents can be targeted in adversarial attacks, as detailed
below:
Environment: Recall the MDP formulation of Section
2.1 - all aspects of the interaction between a DRL agent
and the environment at time t are captured by the tuple
(st, at, rt+1, st+1). It is observed that a fundamental input
to both training and inference processes is the agent’s obser-
vation of the environment’s state st and st+1. An adversary
may perturb the environment and its configuration by some
vector δt (i.e, s′t = st + δt ) to manipulate the training or
inference of the agent. For instance, Behzadan & Munir
[18] demonstrate that through sequential reconfiguration
of obstacles on a road, an adversary can manipulate the
trajectory of a DRL-based autonomous vehicle at test-time.
Sensors: DRL agents observe the environment via their
sensors, and the sensory observation ot of the state st
may contain noise αst , that is, ot = st + αst . Adversarial
manipulation of αst through perturbing the sensor readings
can compromise both the training and inference processes.
An example is sequential blinding of the cameras in a
DRL-based autonomous vehicle via lasers, which can lead
to learning incorrect policies during training or denial of
service at training time.
Reward Signal: Manipulation of the reward signal rt
produced by the environment in response to the actions of
a DRL agent can greatly affect the training process. This
case constitutes an instance of the corrupted reward channel
problem [52], and can be formulated as follows: Given
a true reward function R˙ and a corruption function C ,
Fig. 1: Components of a DRL agent.
the observed reward function is defined as Rˆ : S → Rˆ
as Rˆ(s) := Cs(R˙). The corrupted reward thus induces
an observed MDP (S,A,R, P, Rˆ), which may poison the
experience memory with potentially corrupted observations
of rewards. In the example of the autonomous vehicle, if the
reward function depends on the distance of DRL agent to
a destination as measured by GPS coordinates, spoofing of
GPS signals by the adversary may result in incorrect reward
signals, which can translate to incorrect navigation policies.
Experience Memory: If the adversary can access and ma-
nipulate the experience memory of a DRL agent, it is pos-
sible to greatly influence the training process of the DRL
agent. In the autonomous vehicle example, the agent can
exploit physical or software vulnerabilities to access the
replay memory during or in between training sessions and
mount a poisoning attack.
Actuator: DRL agents influence their environments by
performing actions at via actuators. If the adversary can
manipulate the actuator, the actual action performed will
be different than that chosen by the agent, and hence the
observed experience is corrupted, which can translate into
poisoning of the experience memory.
3.2 Adversarial Capabilities
Threat modeling of the adversary is comprised of two
components, actions available to the adversary, and the
information at his disposal. These capabilities, summarized
in Figure 2, define the adversarial constraints and determine
the feasibility of attack vectors in the threat landscape of
a DRL agent. The attacker may be able to launch attacks
in either passive or active modes. Passive attacks do not
disturb the normal functioning of the target, but aim to infer
information about the parameters and configuration of the
target’s model via observation of state-inference pairs. On
the other hand, active attacks aim to manipulate the output
of the model.
The availability of a priori information to the attacker
can be explored with respect to the type of information.
Adversary’s knowledge of the target model, its param-
eters, algorithm, and the reward function constitute the
agent information, while information about the dynamics and
configuration of the environment comprise the environment
information. The adversary may have varying degrees of
access to either type of information. For instance, adver-
sary may have complete knowledge of the environment’s
6Fig. 2: Attacker capabilities.
dynamics, but may only have access to partial or noisy
observations of changes in the state of the environment.
Similarly, the set of actions available to the attacker may
include perturbing the environment, the observation, or the
reward signal, experience memory, or actuators in a DRL
setting, constrained by a budget B that determines the
permitted extent of actions. For instance, in crafting visual
adversarial examples to perturb observations, the adversary
may be limited to a maximum of Bp pixel modifications at
each step. In the same example, the budget may also limit
the frequency of perturbations to a maximum of one frame
per every Bf samples.
We explore the the different attack vectors available to
adversaries according to the targeted learning phase (train-
ing or testing), as detailed in the following:
3.2.1 Inference Phase
Similar to test-time attacks discussed in Section 2.2,
inference-time attacks against DRL do not tamper the
learned policy and experience data of the target. Passive
attacks at this phase aim for extraction of agent information,
while active attacks at inference-time are similar to evasion
attacks, as both aim to manipulate the output of the agent.
Depending on the information available to the adversary,
attacks can take various forms. If the adversary has access to
the agent information at a level sufficient for precise crafting
of malicious input (e.g., adversarial examples) to the agent,
then the attack is considered whitebox. Conversely, if such
information is not available to the adversary, adversarial ac-
tion is constrained to blackbox attacks. Similarly, if the agent
has access to a degree of knowledge of the environment that
is sufficient for direct exploitation in adversarial actions,
the attack is of the perfect information type. For instance,
knowledge of the dynamics of the Atari game Pong, as well
as perfect observation of target’s actions, enables the adver-
sary to predict the future states and exploit this foresight
in devising a sequence of perturbations to manipulate the
DRL agent into performing poorly. On the other hand, if the
adversary has complete knowledge of the game dynamics
but can only have noisy or intermittent observability on the
agent’s actions, utilizing predictive control for adversarial
actions may be rendered infeasible and the adversary will
have to pursue attacks of type imperfect information.
3.2.2 Training Phase
The objective of attacks targeting the training phase is to ex-
tract, manipulate, or disable the policy learning mechanism
of the DRL agent. Similar to those under the inference phase,
extraction attacks are generally passive, and aim to extract
the model parameters or contents of experience memory.
A simple instance of extraction attacks at training phase
is direct access to the training software or memory. Other
techniques may include inference of parameters based on
observations of the training process. Analogous to training-
time attacks against supervised learners [46], manipulation
or disruption of the training process can be achieved via
two strategies: injection and modification. Injection refers to
alteration of the experience memory via insertion of experi-
ence tuples that change the distribution of observations. A
suitable technique for injection attacks is the manipulation
of the environment itself. Modification attacks aim to change
the contents of actual experiences. Adversarial example
attacks against DRL at training time are a representative
example of such attacks.
4 STATE OF THE ART
In this section, we present an overview of the prominent
literature on the security of DRL. While this body of work is
still at its early stages, the research on security of DRL has
produced notable results which can form the foundation
for further advancements in this domain. Majority of the
relevant papers can be classified under either offensive or
defensive proposals. Furthermore, with the exception of two
papers, offensive proposals are generally focused on either
inference-time attacks or training-time attacks. Accordingly,
we adopt the same scheme in our exploration of these
literature. A summary of papers on attack mechanisms is
presented in Table 1, and the summary of literature on
defensive techniques is provided in Table 2. It must be noted
that while this review is prepared with the aim of producing
a comprehensive survey of relevant literature, due to the
fast rate of publications in machine learning, some recent
yet notable papers may be missing from this review.
4.1 Test-time Attacks
Majority focused on perturbing the observations of the
agent.
Behzadan & Munir [22] published the first report on
test-time vulnerabilities of DRL. Based on the fact that
DQN policies and deep classifiers are essentially of the
same structure and function, therefore DQN policies must
also be vulnerable to adversarial examples. Accordingly,
their paper tests the applicability of adversarial examples
crafted with FGSM and JSMA versus DQN policies under
whitebox settings, and demonstrate that such policies are
also vulnerable to test-time manipulation using adversarial
examples. In whitebox settings, the adversary performs
a Man in The Middle (MITM) attack. He observes the
state of the environment, and with complete and perfect
knowledge of the targets policy parameters, crafts adver-
sarial examples such that the observed state by the tar-
get s′t = st + δt results in different state-action values
Q(s′t, at) 6= Q(st, at), thus leading to the selection of an
alternative action a′t = arg maxat Q(s
′
t, at) instead of the
original selection a∗t = arg maxat Q(st, at).
Furthermore, this paper demonstrates the practicality
of blackbox test-time attacks utilizing the transferability
of adversarial examples [41]. Their experiment follows an
attack flow where the adversary first trains a DQN agent on
the same environment based on the known reward function
of the target, then follows the attack procedure of whitebox
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Phase Mode Attack Surface
Observation State Reward
Test-Time
Whitebox Behzadan & Munir [22], Huang et al. [23],
Patthanaik et al. [53], Lin et al. [54], Han et al [55] , Clark et al. [56] Han et al. [55]
Tretschk et al. [57]
Blackbox Behzadan & Munir [22], Huang et al. [23] Behzadan & Munir [18] Han et al. [55]
Training-Time
Whitebox Kos & Song [58] — Han et al. [55]
Blackbox Behzadan & Munir [22] — —
attacks, with the difference that adversarial examples are
crafted for the dual policy trained for the adversary and ap-
plied to the target. To validate the feasibility of such attacks,
the paper reports the transferability of adversarial examples
crafted via FGSM and JSMA against DQN policies, showing
that more than 70% of such perturbations are transferable
between the two models.
Following the report presented in [22], Huang et al. [23]
analyzed the vulnerability of two other DRL algorithms
to test-time attacks, namely TRPO and A3C. A notable
difference between these two algorithms and DQN is that
both TRPO and A3C train stochastic policies, while DQN
generates a deterministic policy. Applying the same attack
process as that of [22] in whitebox settings, this paper
reports that TRPO and A3C are also vulnerable to test-time
adversarial example attacks crafted with FGSM. Also, the
paper compares DQN policies trained on Atari games with
those of TRPO and A3C, and demonstrates that policies
trained with DQN are more susceptible to such attacks than
TRPO and A3C. The results demonstrate that for FGSM-
based adversarial perturbations, all 3 models are susceptible
to both types of blackbox attacks. However, it is shown that
attacks based on the latter type are less effective as those
in which the adversary has access to the training algorithm
and hyperparameters of its target.
Furthermore, [23] analyzes the susceptibility of all three
algorithms to blackbox attacks that exploit transferability.
The corresponding experiments analyze two types of black-
box attacks: one in which the adversary has complete access
to the environment information, and has knowledge of the
target’s training algorithm and hyperparameters, but not
its random initialization; and one in which the adversary
has no knowledge of the target’s training algorithm or
hyperparameters.
In [53], Patthanaik et al. argue that the classical form
of FGSM used in previous attacks on DRL do not use an
optimal cost function in crafting DRL-specific adversarial
examples. Consequently, this paper proposes two more ef-
fective whitebox approaches to computing such adversarial
perturbations. The first approach is based on a novel cost
function for attacks. The authors formally prove that if
the optimal policy of an agent is given by the probability
mass function (pmf) pi∗(a|s), the objective function whose
minimization leads to optimal adversarial attack on the
agent is given by:
J(s, pi∗) = −
n∑
i=1
pi log pi
∗
i , (5)
where pi∗i = pi
∗(ai|s), pi = P (ai); with P denoting the
adversarial probability distribution. Accordingly, [53] pro-
poses an attack mechanism which solves this minimization
problem via sample-based search. Alternatively, the second
approach leverages Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) to
replace the sample-based approach. Validation of these at-
tacks is performed via experiments on attacking DDQN
and Radial Basis Function based Q-learning (RBFQ) [59]
agents trained in Cart Pole and Mountain Car simulation
environments. The presented results indicate that the attacks
based on the proposed cost function sample-based search
perform consistently better than FGSM and SGD in degrad-
ing the performance of targeted agents. Another noteworthy
observation in these results is that RBFQ agents behave with
superior resilience to adversarial example attacks compared
to DDQN.
The attack methodologies proposed in the aforemen-
tioned papers are all based on continuous and uniform
perturbation of all observations by the adversary. However,
Lin et al. [54] note that this type of attack may be both
practically infeasible and easy to detect. Instead, they pro-
pose whitebox attacks that aim to minimize the number of
required perturbations. Accordingly, two types of attacks
are proposed in [54]: strategically-timed attacks and enchanting
attacks
Strategically-timed attacks aim at perturbing the mini-
mum subset of observations in an episode that results in
the desired degradation or performance. This is achieved
by identifying those states in which the difference between
the value or preference of the agent’s best and worst actions
is greater than an arbitrary threshold defined by the adver-
sary. At such states, the adversary implements adversarial
examples to induce the selection of the least preferred action
over the optimal one. The crafting algorithm used in [54] for
generation of adversarial perturbations is that of Carlini and
Wagner (C&W) [60].
On the other hand, Enchanting attacks aim to “lure” the
target agent from a current state st at time t to a specified
target state sg in H steps. The proposed attack mechanism
is an online planning algorithm, which utilizes generative
modeling to predict the future states and a sampling-based
cross-entropy method [61] to compute a minimum sequence
8of control actions that steers the targeted DRL agent towards
the state sg . The control actions of this attack are adversarial
perturbations crafted via the C&W technique such that the
implemented action of the target agent is one that steers the
agent closer to the state sg . The experimental evaluation of
these two attacks were performed on DQN and A3C agents
trained on five Atari games.
The reported results demonstrate that for both types
of agents, perturbing only 25% of observations via
strategically-timed attacks can achieve the same levels of
degradation as those resulting from uniform attacks. In
accord with the findings of [23], these experiments also
indicate that DQNs are more vulnerable than A3C agents
against test-time adversarial example attacks. In the case of
enchanting attacks, the results claim a 70% success rate in
enchanting both types of agents (DQN and A3C) in three
of the five games in less than H = 40 steps. The authors
claim that failure in the remaining two games (Seaquest and
ChopperCommand) was due to the existence of multiple
random enemies that were not accurately modeled by the
prediction models.
Similar to the enchanting mechanism of [54], Tretschk
et al. [57] propose a whitebox attack mechanism that aims
to maneuver the target agent to pursue an adversarial
goal. Formally, the goal of this attack is to make a DRL
agent trained for the original reward rO to maximize an
arbitrary adversarial reward rA through a sequence of state
perturbations. To this end, the authors develop a mechanism
based on an Adversarial Transformer Network (ATN) [62],
which is a freedforward deep neural network gθ : X → X
that computes the adversarial perturbation to be added to
the input of the target DRL agent. Considering DQNs as
the target of this attack, the proposed mechanism of [57] is
to learn gθ by training in combination with a dual of the
target DQN agent Qφ. Accordingly, the model to be learned
is x → Qφ(x + gθ(x)) where the target’s parameters φ are
fixed and only the ATN parameters θ are learned. [57] claims
that the generalizability of gθ to unseen states allows the
adversary to feed the input state through gθ and then to
the target DQN to achieve the desired outcome. Similar to
the previously discussed attacks, this mechanism is also an
MITM attack that assumes the adversary can manipulate
the state before it is observed by the target. Furthermore,
it requires complete knowledge of the agent information,
as well as access to the target environment for training
the ATN. The experimental results performed on the case
of targeting a Pong-playing DQN agent demonstrate that
the adversary can successfully manipulate the agent into
pursuing the adversarial policy at test-time, given a large-
enough threshold for degree of perturbation.
The literature on test-time attacks on DRL that are not
based on adversarial examples is still very scarce. For in-
stance, Han et al. [55] investigate the case of a DRL agent in
a Software Defined Network (SDN), tasked with preventing
the propagation of a malware in the network by identifying
the compromised nodes and deciding on taking one of the
following actions at each time step: isolating and patching
a node, reconnecting a node and its links, migrating the
critical server, and taking no action. The reward value
for this agent depends on whether the critical servers are
compromised and the number of reachable nodes from such
servers, as well as the number of compromised nodes, and
the cost of migration. It is also assumed that the detection
mechanism of the agent can be manipulated by the ad-
versary (i.e., the adversary can induce False Positive (FP)
or False Negative (FN) results in the detector), but is con-
strained by a threshold on how many such manipulations
can be implemented at each time step. The test-time attacks
proposed in [55] are two-fold: indiscriminate attacks aim to
prevent the DRL agent from taking the optimal action at
at time t, and targeted attacks aim to force the agent into
taking a specific action a′t at time t. Considering DDQN and
A3C as DRL algorithms for the target agent, the objective
for targeting DDQN agents is to maximize Q(st + δt, a′t)
for action a′t at state st using perturbation δt. Similarly, the
objective for targeting A3C is to maximize pi(a′t|st + δt) for
the stochastic policy pi. For these attacks, [55] develops a
whitebox attack methodology, where the attacker can access
the target’s model. This attack requires the computation of
those nodes whose FP or FN detection would facilitate the
adversarial objective. Accordingly, [55] proposes an integer
programming approach to deriving the set of such nodes at
each time step. The authors also propose a blackbox attack
technique, which is based on training surrogate models of
the target with either the same or different hyperparameters
and then following the procedure of the whitebox attacks.
The experimental results produced in this paper indicate
that in the majority of cases, both whitebox and blackbox
attacks succeed in compromising the critical servers. It is
also noted that there is no significant difference between the
success rate of whitebox and blackbox attacks.
Clark et al. [56] demonstrate that the Q-learning policy
of an autonomous navigation robot is susceptible to sensory
manipulation. In this work, the ultrasonic collision avoid-
ance of the robot was manipulated via artificial ultrasonic
“pings” that would allow the attacker to manipulate the
trajectory of the robot. Within the domain of autonomous
navigation, Behzadan & Munir [18] propose an adversarial
DRL agent specifically trained to manipulate the operating
environment of an autonomously navigating DRL agent and
induce collisions or trajectory manipulations by exploiting
the collision avoidance policy of the target. In this attack,
the adversarial DRL agent is trained as another autonomous
navigation agent with a reward function that incorporates
adversarial objectives, such as pursuing trajectories that will
lead to the target colliding with itself or other objects in the
environment. This attack is whitebox and requires access to
the trained policy of the adversary, but not necessarily its
parameters and hyperparameters used in its training.
4.2 Training-Time Attacks
The original paper of Behzadan & Munir [22] also demon-
strates the vulnerability of DRL to training-time attacks.
This paper investigates the feasibility of policy manipu-
lation attacks against DQN agents leveraging adversarial
examples. Accordingly, the authors develop the policy ma-
nipulation attack, the mechanism of which is illustrated in
Figure 3. In this attack, the adversary aims at inducing an
arbitrary policy piadv on the target DQN at training time.
This attack mechanism assumes a blackbox adversary, who
does not have access to the parameters of the target θt at
any time step t, but is aware of its reward function, training
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algorithm, and architecture. Furthermore, the adversary is
assumed to have complete access to and knowledge of the
training environment. The only parameter that the adver-
sary can manipulate using this attack is the observed state
of the environment, hence this adversary can be considered
an MITM capable of perturbing the input stream from the
environment to the target DQN agent.
At every iteration of the training process, a DQN agent
following -greedy exploration performs an action deter-
mined by the following mechanism:
at =
{
random action, with probability 
arg max
a
Q(st, a), with probability 1−  (6)
Once the action is performed, the observation tuple
(st, at, rt+1, st+1) is stored in experience replay. At every
p iterations, the agent samples a random minibatch of ob-
servations, and performs a gradient descent step on Eq. (4)
with respect to the parameters of the native Q-network. As
discussed in Section 2, the DQN framework is comprised
of two neural networks, one is the native Q-network and
the other is the target network Qˆ whose architecture and
parameters are copies of the native network sampled once
every c iterations.
Consequently, the attacker can manipulate the learning
process of DQN by crafting states st such that Qˆ(st+1, a; θ−t )
identifies an incorrect choice of optimal action at st+1. If the
attacker is capable of crafting adversarial inputs s′t and s
′
t+1
such that the value of Eq. (4) is minimized for a specific
action a′, then the policy learned by DQN at this training
step is optimized towards suggesting a′ as the optimal
action given the state st. In the proposed attack mechanism,
the attacker observes interactions of its target with the
environment (st−1, at−1, rt, st). If the resulting state st is
not terminal (i.e., the episode does not end at that state),
the attacker then calculates the perturbation vectors δˆt for
the current state st such that maxa′Qˆ(st + δˆt, a′; θ−t ) causes
Qˆ to be maximum when a′ = pi∗adv(st), i.e., the maximum
expected return is obtained when the action taken at st
is determined by the attacker’s policy. The attacker then
reveals the perturbed state s′t to the target, and re-trains the
replica based on the new state and action.
Considering that the attacker is not aware of the tar-
get’s network architecture and its parameters at every time
step, crafting adversarial states relies on a blackbox tech-
nique exploiting the transferability of adversarial examples
by training a replica DQN agent and obtaining the state
perturbations from the replica’s Q′ and Qˆ′ networks that
correspond to the target’s Q and Qˆ networks, respectively.
Accordingly, Behzadan and Munir [22] divide this at-
tack into the two phases of initialization and exploitation.
The initialization phase implements processes that must
be performed before the target begins interacting with the
environment, which are:
1) Train a DQN based on attacker’s reward functionR′
to obtain the adversarial policy pi∗adv
2) Create a replica of the target’s DQN and initialize
with random parameters
The exploitation phase implements the attack process
and crafting adversarial inputs, such that the target DQN
performs an action dictated by pi∗adv . This phase constitutes
an attack cycle depicted in figure 3. The cycle initiates
with the attacker’s first observation of the environment,
and runs in tandem with the target’s operation. The au-
thors report experimental verification of this attack against
a Pong-playing DQN. In their experiment, the algorithm
used to craft adversarial perturbations is JSMA. The results
indicate that the adversary is capable of manipulating the
agent towards an always-losing policy in almost the same
number of training steps required to achieve optimal (i.e.,
best reported) performance.
In [58], Kos & Song present an experimental analysis of
whitebox training-time attacks on DRL. Considering A3C
agents training on Pong, the paper first demonstrates that in
comparison to random perturbations, adversarial example
attacks crafted via FGSM are significantly more effective in
degrading the training performance of the agent. Then, the
authors investigate the feasibility of non-contiguous attacks,
in which not all the states of the environment are perturbed.
To this end, three attack scenarios are studied: perturbing
observations at every N frames (frequency-based), recom-
puting adversarial perturbation at every N frame and ap-
plying the last computed perturbation in the intermediate
frames, and using the value function to estimate when to
inject adversarial perturbations to be most effective. In the
corresponding experiments, the attack is initiated after the
agent has reached the optimal (i.e., baseline) performance.
Presented results indicate that while the frequency-based
attack fails to be particularly effective, recomputing at every
tenth frame and reusing the previous perturbation in inter-
mediate frames is almost as effective as the original attack.
For the latter case, the paper develops an attack mechanism
in which the adversarial perturbations are injected only
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when the value function, computed over the original frame,
is above a threshold. The authors present the rationale
behind this method by noting that they only wish to disrupt
the agent in crucial moments, when it is close to achieving
a reward. The results demonstrate that this technique is far
more effective than the previous two cases, and is argued to
be more efficient than uniform perturbation of all frames.
Similar to the case of test-time attacks, the body of work
on training-time attacks that are not based on adversarial
examples is very thin. In the previously discussed paper
by Han et al. [55], the target model is considered to be an
online learner, and hence the authors investigate attacks
that aim to manipulate the training phase of the target
DRL. To this end, [55] presents a poisoning attack based
on flipping the reward signs, with the goal of maximizing
the loss function in the target DDQN agent. In this attack,
once the target samples a batch of experiences for training,
the adversary calculates the gradient of the loss function
with respect to each of the observed reward signals, and
flips the sign of experience with the largest absolute value
of this gradient. In experimental validation of this attack,
the authors impose limit of 5% on the maximum number
of experiences that can be tampered at each training step.
While the results demonstrate that this attack effectively
degrades the training performance of the target, the authors
note that this type of attack only delays the convergence as,
given enough time, the agent still learns the optimal actions.
4.3 State of Defenses
Table 2 summarizes the literature on defensive techniques.
As can be observed from the table, a major area of focus
in mitigation of attacks on DRL is adversarial training. This
approach was first used as a framework for evaluation of
different algorithms. Littman [63] proposed an adversarial
setting for Q-learning algorithms to fit into a multi-agent
game, and training these agents to evaluate their perfor-
mances. Recent research has shown that adversarial training
can also be leveraged to enhance the robustness of RL
agents. Recall from Section 2 that in RL, the typical objective
of an agent is to maximize its expected long-term return
R over possible trajectories τ , assuming a fixed transition
model P (st, at; Φ) characterized by parameters Φ. That is,
R(pi, P ) = Eτ [
T∑
t=0
γtr(st, at)|s0, pi, P ] (7)
However, if there is variation in transition model, then
criteria might be to perform well in expectation over all the
possible transition models. Thus, leading to optimization of
the mean performance of agent. The objective function in
this scenario can be modified to
R(pi) = EP [R(pi, P )] (8)
This is commonly known as the risk neutral formulation.
However, one underlying assumption in this formulation
is that the distribution over transition model parameters is
known a priori. It may not perform well over the transition
model distributions because of high variance. Thus, condi-
tional Value of Risk (CVaR), denoted by RRC , can be used
as optimization criteria for robust control [64]:
RRC(pi) = EP [R(pi, P )|P(R(pi, P ) ≤ β) = α] (9)
Hence, the problem boils down to maximizing the expected
return over the worst α percentile of returns. Thereafter,
for sampling these bad trajectories, Rajeswaran et al. [65]
changed transition model parameters and sample trajecto-
ries by performing rollouts with different parameters. Mo-
rimoto and Doya [66] as well as Pinto et al. [67] adopted an
indirect approach where instead of sampling worst trajecto-
ries from rollout, an adversary is employed which attempts
to lead the RL agent into undesired states. The adversary is
trained by pursuing a reward function that is the negative of
the RL agent’s reward, thereby resulting in max-min game
theoretic formulation. However, it is usually difficult to find
this equilibrium [53].
Inspired by previous results in mitigation of adversar-
ial example attacks against classifiers, the aforementioned
paper by Kos & Song [58] experimentally explores the
effectiveness of re-training DRL agents on adversarial per-
turbations in improving the resilience of agents. In their
experiments, after the initial training in non-noisy environ-
ment, the agent is first allowed to re-train while an adver-
sary injects either random noise or FGSM perturbations on
each frame. Once the agent reaches good performance, the
training is frozen and evaluated in a new environment with
training-time attacks. The results presented in [58] demon-
strate that re-trained agents can be resilient against certain
levels of FGSM perturbation. Also, the paper reports that the
re-trained agent is resilient against FGSM perturbations of
greater or smaller magnitude than that of the perturbations
used during re-training.
In the work of Pattanaik et al. [53], once the test-time
attack techniques (discussed in Section 4.1) are developed,
the authors investigate the effectiveness of adversarial re-
training in test-time resiliency of DDQN and DDPG agents
to adversarial perturbations. In response to the shortcom-
ings of approaches proposed in [65] and [66], the proposed
approach utilizes an adversary that fools the agent into
sampling worst trajectories directly. In this approach, the
algorithm is first trained in non-noisy environments. Then,
the agent is retrained by training in a noisy environment
in which an adversary constantly attacks the agent us-
ing the previously detailed gradient based attack (Section
4.1). Presented results indicate that adversarial training of
DDQN and DDPG agents enhances their resilience to test-
time adversarial example attacks.
In [68], Behzadan & Munir investigate the test-time
and training-time resilience of DQN agents trained under
noncontiguous training-time attacks -that is, attacks that do
not aim to perturb all observations. In this work, the attack
mechanism follows that of [22], but instead of perturbing all
state samples, the adversary either applies FGSM perturba-
tion to each observation with a fixed probability P (attack)
or leaves it untouched. In experimental analysis of such
attacks, the authors compare DQN agents training on the
Pong and Breakout environments. The attacks were initiated
at or close to the convergence of mean return towards the
optimal (i.e., baseline) value. The results indicate that in
both environments, DQN agents are able to recover from
noncontiguous attacks with attack probabilities p = 0.2 and
p = 0.4 and converge to optimal performance, while they
fail to recover under attacks with p = 0.8 and p = 1.0
(contiguous attack). It is observed that for the agents that
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TABLE 2: Summary of literature on defensive techniques.
Approach Papers
Adversarial Training Kos & Song [58], Pattanaik et al. [53], Behzadan & Munir [68]
Secure Exploration Behzadan & Munir [69]
Predictive Lin et al. [70]
Hierarchical RL Havens et al. [71]
Game Theoretic Ogunmolu et al. [72], Bravo & Mertikopoulos [73]
recover, the training performance deteriorates almost uni-
formly until a minimum point is reached, from which
onward the agent begins to recover and adjust the policy
towards optimal performance. The authors’ interpretation of
this behavior is based on the statistics of experience replay:
for the agent to recover from adversarial perturbations,
the number of interactions with the perturbed environment
must reach a critical threshold, so that the randomly sam-
pled batches from the experience memory can represent
the statistical significance of perturbations. Furthermore, the
test-time resilience of these adversarially trained agents is
also studied under the worst-case test-time attack scenario
of p = 1.0. The results demonstrate that under test-time at-
tacks, the agents that manage to recover during adversarial
training perform almost as well as the unperturbed agents.
Another venue of research on mitigation techniques
is focused on secure exploration mechanisms. It must be
noted that secure exploration differs from research on safe
exploration [17]; the latter considers accidental and harmful
actions that may arise during exploration of RL agents,
while the former is interested in exploration mechanisms
that enhance or preserve the security of DRL agents against
intentional adversarial attacks. For instance, [69] presents
a comparative study of resilience to adversarial example
attacks between two DQN agents, one adopting the -
greedy exploration mechanism, and the other implementing
a parameter-space noise exploration technique known as
NoisyNet [24]. Contrary to classical exploration heuristics
such as -greedy [3], parameter-space noise is iteratively
and adaptively applied to the parameters of the learning
model, such as weights of the neural network. The results
for the NoisyNet implementation of this paradigm [24]
demonstrate that the addition of adaptive noise to the
parameters of deep RL architectures greatly enhances the
exploration behavior and convergence speed of such algo-
rithms. Accordingly, the authors in [69] hypothesize that
the randomness introduced via parameter noise, not only
enhances the discovery of more creative and robust policies,
but also reduces the effect of whitebox and blackbox adver-
sarial example attacks at both test-time and training-time.
To test the validity of this hypothesis, [69] presents
an evaluation of the test-time and training-time resiliency
of DQN agents based on both NoisyNet and -greedy in
three Atari game environments: Enduro, Assault, and Black-
out. Under test-time attacks, the results demonstrate that
while both models are susceptible of FGSM perturbations,
NoisyNet DQNs are more resilient to such attacks than those
based on -greedy. Furthermore, comparison of performance
under blackbox attacks demonstrates significant improve-
ments in Noisynets, as observed in all three cases.
In experiments on training-time attacks, while both types
of agents are shown to be subject to deterioration as a result
of the attack based on the blackbox mechanism of Behzadan
& Munir [22], NoisyNet agents demonstrate significantly
stronger resilience to such attacks than -greedy agents. The
authors argue that this is due to the enhanced generalization
and reduced transferability in NoisyNet models.
In [70], Liu et al. propose a defense mechanism to defend
RL agent from test-time whitebox adversarial attacks by
leveraging the temporal coherence of multiple observations
in sequential decision-making tasks. To this end, a visual
forsight module is trained to predict the current observation
based on past observations and actions. Accordingly, at time
step t, the action-conditioned observation prediction model
Gθg takes m previous observations xt−m:t−1 and corre-
sponding m actions at−m:t−1 as input to predict the current
observation xˆt. Given a normal observation xnormalt at the
current time step t, the action distribution that the agent
uses to sample an action from is piθpi (x
normal
t ), which should
be similar to the action distribution of piθpi (xˆt) from the pre-
dicted observation. On the other hand, if the current input
is adversarially perturbed, that is the agent observed xadvt
instead of xnormalt , then the resulting action distribution
piθpi (x
adv
t ) should differ from piθpi (xˆt) because the goal of
the adversary is to perturb the input observation xt to cause
the agent to take a different action. Therefore, the similarity
between two action distributions can be used to detect the
presence of adversarial attacks. To validate this claim, the
paper presents an experiment on DQN agents trained on
five Atari games (Pong, Seaquest, Freeway, ChopperCom-
mand, and MsPacman). Also, the experiment applies three
types of adversarial example crafting algorithms, namely:
FGSM, Basic Iterative Method [74], and C&W. The presented
results indicate that the proposed method is able to detect
between 60% to 100% of adversarial example attacks against
all DQN agents, and is shown to have superior detection
performance to adversarial example detection techniques
developed for deep classifiers, namely Feature Squeezer
[75], AutoEncoder [76], and Dropout [77].
During policy learning, information perturbation can
be generally viewed as a bias that can prevent the agent
from effectively learning the desired policy. Inspired by
this idea, Havens et al. [71] propose a hierarchical meta-
learning framework, named Meta-Learned Advantage Hi-
erarchy (MLAH). Their work considers a policy learning
problem where there are periods of adversarial attacks that
corrupt state observations during the continuous learning of
the agent, and aims at the online mitigation of the bias intro-
duced by the attack into the nominal policy. The proposed
MLAH algorithm is based on the assumption that DRL
agents learn sub-policies (i.e., skills) en route to learning the
ultimate task. Given that the agent has developed accurate
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expectations of its sub-policies, if the underlying task were
to change at anytime, the agent may notice that the result of
its action has changed with respect to what was expected. In
an RL framework, comparing the expected return of a state
to the observed return of some action is typically known
as the advantage. Accordingly, MLAH uses the estimated of
advantage as a measure of underlying changes in a task,
and leverages this metric to switch from one sub-policy to
another more appropriate sub-policy. Consequntly, even if
the adversary could compute a series of likely states to
fool an MLAH-based agent, the advantage would still be
affected and a master agent may detect the attack. The
adversary would have to consecutively fool the agent with a
state that would be expected to give an equally bad reward
as that of the manipulated state. The authors claim that
this constraint would make the perturbation especially hard
or infeasible to compute. Experimental results presented in
the paper demonstrate that for PPO agents, MLAH-based
agents demonstrate superior robustness and resilience to
noncontiguous adversarial example attacks at training-time.
Another area of research is that of approaches based on
game-theoretic modeling. A well-known instance of such
approaches is in the field of multi-agent reinforcement
learning, where agents are engaged in zero-sum games
and utilize manipulation and misinformation to beat the
other agents and maximize individual rewards [51]. More
recently, Ogunmolu et al. [72] present such an approach
by modeling the adversarial interaction between a DRL
agent and a training-time adversary as a minimax iterative
dynamic game, and present a meta-algorithm for controlling
the training process and steering it towards saddle-point
equilibria. In [73], Bravo & Mertikopoulos formulate the
problem of corrupt reward channel (defined in Section 3.1)
as a zero-sum evolutionary game between the RL agent and
the adversary, and formally analyze the Nash equilibria in
such settings.
4.4 Benchmarks and Metrics
As discussed in the previous sections, the majority of current
literature on secure RL utilize experimental analysis for
validation of their proposals. Another observation from
this review is that while one particular problem may be
approached by various research efforts, lack of consistent
metrics renders the quantitative comparison of their pro-
posals and results difficult. This section aims to provide
an overview of the simulation benchmarks and evaluation
metrics that are used in the current literature with the goals
of facilitating further research and providing the grounds
for a more consistent body of work in the future.
4.4.1 Simulation Benchmarks
Similar to the general research on DRL, many of the re-
viewed papers on secure DRL base their experimental anal-
ysis on Atari games and similar arcade-like environments
provided within the OpenAI Gym platform [78]. Gym pro-
vides an RL-friendly interface with a variety of benchmarks
for RL research, including the Arcade Learning Environ-
ment [79], RLLab benchmark for continuous control [80],
and many more. The Gym interface provides a seamless
platform for the integration of RL agents with the simulation
environment. This interface provides the agent with access
to the state information (e.g., game frames, score, etc.), game
controls, and the progression speed of the environment (e.g.,
waiting for training step to complete before progressing to
the next step). While seldom referenced in the secure DRL
literature, OpenAI has introduced two more advanced plat-
forms to Gym, OpenAI Universe1 [81] and OpenAI Retro2,
which provide access to more complex environments, as
well as enhanced implementations for benchmarking and
recording the experiment.
With regards to implementations of adversarial example
attacks, Cleverhans [82] is the most popular choice in the
current research. This library provides standardized ref-
erence implementations of adversarial example construc-
tion techniques and adversarial training. While originally
developed on the Tensorflow [83] stack, the interface to
Cleverhans is designed to accept models implemented using
any model framework (such as Keras [84] and PyTorch[85]).
To facilitate the utilization of this library for experiments on
DRL, Behzadan & Munir have developed RLAttack [86] as
an interface between DRL agents implemented in Tensor-
flow and the adversarial example techniques in Cleverhans.
The current version of this tool is compatible with all DRL
algorithms available in OpenAI Baselines [87], and supports
training-time and test-time attacks, contiguous and noncon-
tiguous attacks, and both blackbox and whitebox attacks on
DRL agents.
Another benchmark used by current secure DRL re-
search is DeepMind’s AI Safety Gridworlds [88]. This bench-
mark provides simple environments based on the classic
Gridworld settings for experiments on RL safety issues
that include safe interruptibility, avoidance of side effects,
reward hacking, safe exploration, and robustness to adver-
saries.
4.4.2 Metrics
Evaluation metrics utilized in the current literature of DRL
are generally ad hoc and non-generalizable. For adversarial
example attacks, the robustness of an agent is often mea-
sured by the minimum value of perturbation threshold 
that results in successful attacks. In studies on both training-
time and test-time attacks, a popular metric is the number
of steps (e.g., training epochs, episodes, iterations) required
to achieve an adversarial objective. Similarly, in blackbox
attacks, percentage of transferable adversarial examples
between models is an often-used metric as a measure of
susceptibility. In all studies, the common metric of success
for adversarial attacks is (mean) return over episodes or
epochs, which demonstrates the feasibility and effectiveness
of attacks with respect to computational cost and time.
While not yet adopted by the secure DRL literature,
Ogunmolu et al. [72] propose a novel metric for the robust-
ness of a policy in the presence of adversaries. Accordingly,
let pi be the nominal policy of an agent, and consider an
adversarial agent interacting with the nominal agent so that
the closed-loop interaction of both agents is described by
the discretized Euler equation given in Eq. (10):
xt+1 = ft(xt, ut, vt), ut ∼ pit (10)
∼= ft(xt, vt), t = 0, ..., T − 1.
1. https://github.com/openai/universe
2. https://github.com/openai/retro
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where xt is the n-dimensional state vector, ut is the m-
dimensional nominal agent’s action, and vt denotes the
adversarial agent’s p-dimensional action. For the instanta-
neous rewards (or costs) of form,
rt(xt, ut, vt) = ct(xt, ut)− ζgt(vt), (11)
where ct(xt, ut) represents the nominal instantaneous cost,
gt(.) is a norm on the adversarial input that penalizes the
actions of the adversary, and ζ > 0 is a disturbance term that
controls the strength of the adversary. Hence, the adversary
faces a maximization problem of the form
max
ψ∈Ψ
Eut pit
T∑
t=0
c(xt, ut)− ζg(vt) (12)
= max
ψ∈Ψ
E
T∑
t=0
r−ζt (xt, vt),
where ψ is the adversarial policy.
Varying ζ changes the penalty incurred by the adver-
sarial agent’s actions. As ζ → ∞, the adversary’s optimal
policy is to do nothing, since any action will incur an
infinite penalty. Conversely, as ζ decreases, the adversary
incurs lower penalties, causing a larger system disturbance.
Accordingly, the authors propose the inverse of the smallest
ζ-value for which the adversary causes unacceptable perfor-
mance degradation as measure of robustness of the nominal
agent’s policy pi.
5 OPEN CHALLENGES
While the current state of the art is promising, there remains
an extensive horizon of unknowns comprised of various
venues that need to be explored to establish the grounds
for analysis and assurance of security in DRL agents. This
section enumerates a subset of such venues in terms of
problem statements and promising directions.
5.1 Formal Treatment of Vulnerabilities
The plethora of vulnerabilities identified in this paper
present a tangible and practical threat to DRL deployments
and systems. While some efforts are made to formally
analyze and establish the dynamics of such vulnerabilities,
there is still no concrete treatment of the underlying causes
for any such vulnerability. This may be, in part, due to
the lack of a solid understanding of the dynamics in DRL
algorithms. Yet, understanding the parametric bounds of
DRL vulnerabilities and their controlling factors can give
rise to major leaps towards designing agents and defenses
that can be assuredly deployed in hostile settings.
5.2 Adversarial Manipulation State and Actuators
As demonstrated in Table 1, there are few studies on attacks
that directly perturb the state instead of an agent’s observa-
tions. In particular, training-time attacks via state manipula-
tion are yet to be investigated. Similarly, the feasibility and
impact of attacks targeting the DRL agent’s actuators are
still unexplored. Considering the importance of these two
components in the cyber-physical implementations of DRL,
such studies will bridge a significant gap in our understand-
ing of the adversarial risks in physical DRL agents.
5.3 Attacks on Confidentiality
While many of the attack vectors identified in Section 3
are already realized in the literature, those targeting the
confidentiality of DRL agents are yet to be studied. With the
accelerating percolation rate of DRL techniques in various
industries, the sustainability of commercial DRL markets
will be heavily dependent on ensuring that competitors
cannot access and replicate commercial DRL models. Fur-
thermore, as extensively noted in Section 4, access to agent
information can enhance the capabilities of adversaries tar-
geting DRL agents. To this end, it is necessary to establish
the attack mechanisms targeting this aspect of DRL security
before the malicious actors, and pursue the development of
mechanisms for mitigating against such attacks.
5.4 Secure Reward Functions
The literature on AI safety (e.g., [89]) has identified multiple
classes of risks arising from the reward function specified for
an agent. Instances of such risks include wireheading and
reward hacking (agent exploiting or gaming misspecified
objectives). Yampolskiy [90] provides a detailed analysis of
the security risks that may arise from misspecified reward
functions, but much of those and similar proposals remain
to be analyzed from a technical perspective. Of paramount
importance is to establish methods and frameworks for
analysis and evaluation of reward functions in the context
of DRL security. Also, another crucial venue of research is
the pursuit and development methodologies that embed
the control and mitigation of security issues arising from
misspecified reward functions in the design process.
5.5 Secure Exploration
As discussed in Section 4.3, the choice of exploration mech-
anism may influence the resilience and robustness of DRL
agents. While safe exploration is widely studied in the
domain of safe RL, adopting and extending this parallel
work for DRL security is a promising venue of research.
For instance, extending the safe exploration mechanisms of
[17] and others to allow secure oversight and in-built con-
trol against adversarially-induced trajectories can provide
the grounds for building the work on secure exploration.
Similarly, comparative analysis of current exploration mech-
anisms in terms of their effect on resilience and robustness of
DRL agents can provide valuable guidelines for designing
secure DRL.
5.6 Online Adjustment
In the complex domains of deployment, online DRL learners
may adopt adversarially-induced behaviors. While restart-
ing the training process may seem as a trivial solution to this
problem, often it may be preferable to treat the misbehavior
during training instead in order to preserve the efficiency of
the learning process. To this end, development of techniques
for identification of misbehaviors, as well as minimally
invasive and efficient control mechanisms for correction of
such misbehaviors provides a wide field of research that
remains generally unexplored. A promising venue in this
field is the problem of optimal policy manipulation: apply
the minimal number of perturbations required to modify a
DRL policy to a desired policy. Furthermore, development
of mechanisms for analysis of the influence and effects of
individual experiences in the replay memory may provide
an alternative set of solutions to online adjustment.
5.7 Secure AI Safety Mechanisms
While the research on AI safety problems grows into tech-
nical developments, it is vital to ensure that the emerging
proposals of this research satisfy the security requirements
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of DRL agents. For instance, mechanisms developed for safe
interruptibility and off-switch problems [89] may include
external controls that by design enable manipulation of the
DRL behaviors. Analyzing the security implications and
solutions for such development is an exciting and open
venue of research, which can potentially make use of devel-
opments in secure authentication and authorization research
in cybersecurity.
5.8 Psychological Parallels
Since its inception, AI has been closely connected to psy-
chology and cognitive sciences [91]. This connection flows
in both directions: AI researchers study biological cognition
and behavior as inspiration for engineered intelligence, and
cognitive scientists explore AI as a framework for synthesis
and experimental analysis of theoretical ideas [92]. RL is
a significant instance of this interconnection: the computa-
tional algorithms of RL, such as Temporal Difference (TD)
learning were originally inspired from the dopamine system
in biological brains [3]. On the other hand, the work on TD
learning has provided mathematical means of modeling the
neuroscientific dynamics of dopamine cells in the brain, and
has been employed to study disorders such as schizophrenia
and the consequences of pharmacological manipulations
of dopamine on learning [93]. As detailed in [94], many
aspects of security and safety in DRL can be viewed as
psychological disorders. For instance, wireheading can man-
ifest as delusional and addictive behavior [90]. Similarly,
sequences of interactions with extremely negative rewards
and stresses within the exploration/exploitation trajectories
of DRL agents can potentially give rise to behavioral disor-
ders such as depression and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD) [95]. Furthermore, the generic manifestation of the
value alignment problem [96] in AI is in the form of be-
havioral characteristics that are harmful to either the agent
or the environment and society, which falls well within the
definition of psychological disorders.
Research on such parallelism can benefit from a plethora
of mechanisms and models developed in the field of psy-
chology. For instance, understanding the dynamics of gam-
bling or substance addiction and the role of advertisement
and social settings in the emergence of such deleterious be-
haviors can provide insights into the dynamics of policy ma-
nipulation attacks on DRL agents. Similarly, the techniques
used for treatment of addiction can give rise to adoptable
mechanisms for mitigation and adjustment techniques in
DRL agents.
6 CONCLUSIONS
This paper presented a comprehensive study of the se-
curity issues in Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL). As
an extension to classical adversarial machine learning, we
formalized the security problem in DRL, and presented
multiple schemes for classification of attack vectors and
vulnerabilities in DRL. We reviewed the literature on at-
tacks and defenses in the domain of DRL, and identified
current benchmarks and metrics for evaluating mechanisms
proposed within the context of DRL security. Finally, we
enumerated a number of open research problems and po-
tential approaches to facilitate further research in this area.
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